

**From Wary Collaboration to Wary Competition?
U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation Since
the End of the Cold War**

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Abstract

In September 1990, President George H.W. Bush called for a *New World Order*. Believing as others did back then that the end of the Cold War between the US and USSR offered real promise for an entirely different approach to international relations and security cooperation, his address to a joint session of Congress in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, pointed to the effort to respond collaboratively with more than 20 other partners. Indeed, he made this call just after returning from a summit meeting in Helsinki with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. This ushered in a phase of hope that a new international system of peace and cooperation could be built. A long line of scholars and commentators argued for the dismantling of Cold War security institutions like NATO, suggesting that regional economic organizations like the European Union and global institutions in the United Nations system could now attain prominence with the end of the U.S. –Soviet deadlock, especially in the UN Security Council. Realists like John Mearsheimer, however, soon cautioned that the emerging epoch might well mean a return to the conflict and instability of previous decades, indeed centuries, as pressures and ambitions long held in check by the stability of the Cold War alliance systems and Mutual Assured Destruction nuclear weapons policies, would now spring force in ugly and hateful ways.

The record since those early years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall has been mixed. Neither the United Nations system nor the European Union has emerged as an effective alternative institutional approach to the chief political and security challenges facing Eurasia. Accordingly, NATO has not been dismantled. Indeed, it has grown in scope and function to include new relationships, indeed some degree of partnership with both the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and also with many of the successor states to the Former Soviet Union.

The promise of increased security collaboration, even partnership between the U.S. and Russia, that looked substantial to the optimists of the early 1990s, was in fact realized in part, at times, with the drawing down of conventional military forces in Europe, the de-nuclearization of some parts of the former Soviet Union, and the more general negotiated reduction in nuclear weapons held by the two powers. The establishment of NATO's Partnership for Peace, the Russia-NATO Council, and the concrete elements of U.S.-Russia Anti-Terrorism cooperation in the wake of 9/11 must be noted as well. But the promise of a *New World Order* was certainly not realized. Indeed, recent examples of political conflict and rivalry may suggest a possible return to the "bad old days" of the Cold War or at least the evolution of a 21st Century international system that is not all that different from the great power rivalries of previous centuries. What remains to be seen is whether U.S.-Russian relations will be characterized by increased tension and rivalry, with the prospect of military confrontation again not out of the question, or will common interests and the initial efforts to work out means of cooperating in the face of common challenges prevail.

Introduction

In September 1990, President George H.W. Bush, echoing Wilsonian sentiments of nearly a century before, called for a *New World Order*. Believing as others did back then that the end of the Cold War between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. offered real promise for an entirely different approach to international relations and security cooperation, his address to a joint session of Congress in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, pointed to the effort to respond collaboratively with more than 20 other partners. Indeed, he made this call just after a summit meeting in Helsinki with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. In his words:

As you know, I've just returned from a very productive meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev. And I am pleased that we are working together to build a new relationship. In Helsinki, our joint statement affirmed to the world our shared resolve to counter Iraq's threat to peace. Let me quote: "We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors." Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted United Nations action against aggression. A new partnership of nations has begun. (G.H.W. Bush, 9/11/90)

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The record since those early years after the fall of the Berlin Wall has been mixed. Neither the United Nations system nor the European Union has emerged as an effective alternative institutional approach to the chief political and security challenges facing Eurasia. Accordingly, NATO has not been dismantled. Indeed, it has grown in scope and function to include new relationships, indeed some degree of partnership with both the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and also with many of the successor states to the Former Soviet Union. NATO established a Partnership for Peace with a range of training and collaboration opportunities for the successor states to the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. By 2007, NATO has 26 full members and a special relationship with the Russian Federation.

The promise of increased security collaboration, even partnership between the U.S. and Russia, that looked substantial to the optimists of the early 1990s, was in fact realized in part, at times, with the drawing down of conventional military forces in Europe, the de-nuclearization of some parts of the former Soviet Union, and the more general negotiated reduction in nuclear weapons held by the two powers. Beyond the establishment of NATO's Partnership for Peace, the Russia-NATO Council, and the concrete elements of U.S.-Russia Anti-Terrorism cooperation in the wake of 9/11 must be noted. But the promise of a *New World Order* was certainly not realized. Indeed, recent examples of political conflict and rivalry may suggest a possible return to the "bad old days" of the Cold War or at least the evolution of a 21st Century international system that is not all that

different from the great power rivalries of previous centuries. Has there been a warming with traditional rivals to Russia like China, Iran and Turkey that has meant to check the perceived ambitions of the “World’s only Superpower?” Is this warmth normal and innocuous or does it belie a more sinister ambition to extend influence and frustrate regional stability and democratization? What remains to be seen is whether U.S.-Russian relations will be characterized by increased tension and rivalry, with the prospect of military confrontation again not out of the question, or will common interests and the initial efforts to work out means of cooperating in the face of common challenges prevail.

The Theoretical and Historical Context

Even before the Fall of 1989, David Calleo rejected the viability of the NATO Alliance as structured at that time, finding both the options of more effective burden-sharing and disengagement inadequate, and thus calling for "devolution" --a shift of responsibility within the alliance to Europe's major powers.¹ Similarly, Ronald Steel spoke of NATO's "last mission."² Michael Armitage sketched key factors in the immediate, medium term, and longer term future of NATO.³ John Mearsheimer argued in 1990 that the end of the Soviet threat might well dictate the end of the Alliance. "Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance it headed for forty years may disintegrate"(Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 52). A decade later, Celeste Wallender assessed NATO’s institutional assets and adaptability after the Cold War in 2000 (Wallender, 2000,pp. 705-735).

This tradition of debate not only remained active throughout the 1990s, but it also gained a new sense of urgency. European defense planners found that perplexing new security challenges called for solutions rather more imaginative than the simple and cost-effective reliance on the American nuclear deterrent that NATO seemed to provide. The debates over NATO enlargement and the prospect for "out of area" deployments of NATO forces or assets continue to raise questions about whether the Alliance can and should remain a cornerstone of US and Western European policy.

John Ikenberry entered the debate somewhat indirectly, with his call for the U.S. to seek "engagement." Institutions like NATO have helped to do this in an effective way, going back to the post-World War II European dictum that NATO was to keep the Soviets out, the U.S. in and Germany down. There is a real place for institutions in the future he argued (Ikenberry, 2001). Zbigniew Brzezinski, writing in 2004 in The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, argued that American hegemony was by then a fact of life, but he went on to stress that the US and the EU should "...weave together a broader fabric of binding and institutionalized international cooperation." (pp. 213-218)

In The Sorrows of Empire, Chalmers Johnson argued in effect that the choice had already been made, and imprudent empire is the U.S. path. He warned that, "Empires do not last, and their ends are usually unpleasant." (p. 310) The path the US chose will lead to disasters, and "When such disasters occur, as they—or as-yet-unknown versions of them—certainly will, a world disgusted by the betrayal of the idealism associated with the United States will welcome them, just as most people did when the former USSR came apart. Like other empires of the past century, the United States has

chosen to live not prudently, in peace and prosperity, but as a massive military power athwart an angry, resistant globe.” (pp. 311-12)

Mearsheimer took the "offense" in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. In a rich review of the historical record dating from the early 19th Century, he articulated a theory of "offensive realism" and suggested that the engagement of the 1990s was somewhat anomalous. He argued that "the United States is an offshore balancer, not the world's sheriff." He concluded that the U.S. policy of engaging China was misguided. China must be contained. Institutions are unlikely to be useful in this in any "independent" way. "It would be a grave mistake... for the United States to turn its back on the realist principles that have served it well since its founding" (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 392-402).

Charles Kupchan predicted The End of the American Era (2003) in an analysis of the rising economic power of Europe through integration and the concomitant political influence that must result. He argued that the U.S. must re-examine its role in the geopolitics of the 21st Century which will be increasingly unpredictable and unstable. Robert Kagan (2003) discussed the emerging division between Europe and the U.S. in terms Of Paradise and Power, noting that the division is not new, only more stark. In his words,

It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant's "perpetual peace." Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the

defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. (Kagan, 2003, p. 3)

Most recently, Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz trace the demise of liberal internationalism in the U.S., arguing that

...the bipartisan compact between power and partnership has been effectively dismantled. If left unattended, the political foundations of U.S. statecraft will continue to disintegrate, exposing the country to the dangers of an erratic and incoherent foreign policy. To avoid this fate, U.S. leaders will have to fashion a new brand of internationalism—one that will necessarily entail less power and less partnership if it is to have a chance of securing broad domestic support. To find a new equilibrium between the nation's commitments abroad and its polarized politics at home, the United States will need a grand strategy that is as selective and judicious as it is purposeful. (Kupchan and Trubowitz, p. 10.)

They term this a strategy of selective engagement involving more reliance on “pragmatic partnerships, flexible concerts, and task-specific coalitions.” They build a case for it with an interesting discussion of the collapse of bipartisanship in U.S. foreign policy—indeed the emergence of a political party system polarized on regional lines, with an ideological tinge, and the response to the Iraq War.

"Critical theory" and constructivist perspectives offered by Robert Cox and Alexander Wendt, used the end of the Cold War to call for bold systemic change to a more communitarian world based on justice rather than power. Cox suggested that fundamental change in the international system and the consequent restructuring and pursuit of order in a post-Cold War Europe might be an opportunity for the evolution of an entirely new form. In his words,

Europe, in sum, can be a proving ground for a new form of world order: post-hegemonic in its recognition of co-existing universalistic civilizations; post-Westphalian in its restructuring of political authority into a multi-level system; and

post-globalization in its acceptance of the legitimacy of different paths towards the satisfaction of human needs.⁴

Alexander Wendt further argued that the End of the Cold War suggests the viability of a “Social or Cultural Theory of International Politics” to contrast the traditional arguments of realists. Whether states view each other as enemies, rivals, or friends in “cultures of anarchy” -- shared ideas that help shape states' interests and capabilities – is a fundamental determinant. The key point is that these cultures can change over time as ideas change. International politics is thus not fixed; the international system is not condemned to conflict and war (see: Wendt, 1999, esp. Ch. 6).

This last argument should remind us that there is a long record of interpreting and reinterpreting U.S. and Soviet/Russian foreign policy behavior. This includes extreme revisionists like Gar Alperovitz (1967), William Appleton Williams (1959) and Gabriel and Joyce Kolko (1972) who largely blamed the U.S. for the Cold War, especially the Kolkos who argued among other things that President Truman should have given the Atom Bomb to Stalin in 1945, and that South Korea was responsible for the Korean War. Standard (and post-Cold War) interpretations find these views problematic, but there are real questions to raise about the extent to which misperceptions of intent played a role –indeed some perceptions that may well have been susceptible to cultural influences.

John Lewis Gaddis (1972) offered more balance, stressing that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union wanted another war after World War II. But he also argued that the U.S. never properly understood Soviet actions generally and especially the fears that drove Stalin to direct some of them with urgency. Daniel Yergin (1977) stressed the importance of ideological drivers, noting Stalin’s world revolutionary objectives encapsulated coherently in the State Department’s “Riga axioms,” but

he also noted the importance of Wilsonian ideology and the rise of the concept of the “national security state” on the U.S. side.

Archival information available only after the collapse of Communism led Russian scholars like Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov (1996) to conclude that Stalin was clearly motivated by ideology and was error prone --indeed reckless-- but also was clearly not desirous of a confrontation with the U.S.

The death of Marshall Shulman in 2007-- a towering figure in the interpretation of Soviet and Russian foreign policy -- brings to mind his early works on Stalin’s Foreign Policy Reappraised (1963) and Beyond the Cold War (1966). These were among the first and most satisfying efforts to argue that the determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy were quite complex and required nuanced analysis. Both sides misperceived or at least overreacted to the actions of the other at key points. In his words:

Each side, for quite different reasons, developed oversimplified and emotionally colored stereotypes of the other, which obscured the real nature of the conflict. The result appears to have been a cycle of reactions that took on a life of their own, disproportionate to and only partly related to the real conflict of interest involved. (Shulman, 1966, pp.2-3)

These points on the Cold War struggle may well have implications or guidance for assessing the record of U.S.-Russian security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. We need to avoid falling into the traps of misperception and unintended consequences. We should not lose sight of common interests and should not assume or exaggerate conflicts of interest.

International Institutions in Europe and Eurasia after the Cold War

The decade after the end of the cold war has radically reshaped the institutional configuration in Europe. Some international institutions have disappeared (Warsaw Treaty, CMEA); others had to adapt themselves to the new reality. The United Nations, OCSE and the Western European Union have been hampered in their ability to have a serious impact on conflict resolution in Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union, however, seem to have preserved and partly increased their ability to respond to conflict and promote stability.

The end of the Cold War seemed to bring new promise to the role of the UN in security issues. This was largely due to change in the character and thus posture of the Soviet Union (and to a lesser extent, the People's Republic of China). The lack of agreement between the Superpowers that reflected their perceived and real interests in the years of the Cold War and the Bipolar international system had passed. Obtaining agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council would remain a challenge, but there was some chance finally to fulfill the UN's original planned role for resolving certain types of conflict.

There were preliminary questions to resolve, of course. For example, which types of conflicts are most appropriate or susceptible? The prospects for Security Council support are best undoubtedly when there is clearcut inter-state aggression and where there are no important conflicting interests among any of the 5 permanent Security Council members.

A Security Council resolution as a response to aggression has been viewed as important, as in the Persian Gulf War, because it carried with it some degree of global legitimization. This in turn could help with the challenge of building support for military intervention within reluctant

democracies like the US. Such legitimization has helped to cleanse what might otherwise be viewed as the arrogant actions of the rich states of the northern hemisphere versus the Third World.

A wide range of Security Council resolutions were passed to deal with Eurasian conflict beginning in 1991. These included several that condemned the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY: Serbia and Montenegro) and set up a system of sanctions, as well as "even-handed" efforts to curtail arms transfers to all parties. The UN's operational role began in responding to the Croatian conflict with the FRY. The Croatian Constitution failed to include guarantees for Serb minorities in Croatian territory; this provided a pretext for Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic to send in the Yugoslav army ostensibly to protect Serbs. UNPROFOR and UNCRO were undermanned and poorly organized "peacekeeping" operations with the aim initially of implementing the Vance peace plan of 1991. Milosevic had agreed to pull the Yugoslav army out of Croatia, but equipment and "police" were left behind; the conflict continued, and UNPROFOR was nearly powerless to provide or even promote order. As the conflict turned to one largely between the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, UNPROFOR expanded its functions, with some NATO assistance, into what might be described as more of an enforcement than a peacekeeping role. It largely failed in this, and the dissatisfaction evident on the NATO side of the relationship had much to do with efforts to start anew with the Dayton negotiations.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued early on that the international community should not expect too much from the United Nations, given the lack of a standing UN army and the highly constrained resources for "peacekeeping" operations -- particularly now that the UN is charged with mounting perhaps 20 such operations over the globe at any one time.⁵ Clearly, the present UN "force structure"

was never designed to intervene in a civil war; nor could it stand up to determined resistance in an international conflict. UN forces should be kept from such conflicts. The Gulf War model of a mandate from the UN passed on to states or alliances well-placed to deliver appropriate force to ensure compliance seemed a likely UN preference. Indeed, a system of decentralized "subcontracting" financed by the subcontractors may be the only way the UN can operate in its present situation of constrained financial resources, too few peacekeeping forces and a cumbersome organizational structure. The alternative may be simply to refuse to intervene more frequently (allowing the stronger side to prevail more efficiently), for example only when both sides are truly prepared to accept a peacekeeping mission by the UN. Unfortunately, this situation may not be common in the relative anarchy that has emerged from the relative stability of the Cold War. A standing UN army, earmarked national forces on call, a global tax on arms sales, more regular and substantial contributions of forces from major powers are among the solutions proposed by various analysts and UN officials.⁶ Thus far, however, these proposals have not been greeted warmly by key governments, some of which clearly have no desire to expand the power or independence of the Secretary General (particularly when it was Boutros-Ghali).

The end of the Cold War has at the same time both reaffirmed to many analysts the value of NATO in 40 plus years of European defense preparedness and led to questions about its future role and utility. The latter concern, in turn, has led to substantial adjustment within the organization to respond to new types of threats and low intensity conflict and engage the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in a larger, more inclusive framework for European security. Instability, conflict and the potential for civil war in the former Soviet Union and concerns about the future role

of the military or a new nationalist regime in Russian, however, could challenge NATO members in a major way reminiscent of the most threatening years of the Cold War.

NATO adopted a new strategic concept at the Rome meeting of the North Atlantic Council in November of 1991, "...to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe."⁷ The concept spelled out the new risks to the Alliance. It reaffirmed the Alliance's defensive character, but it called for new dialogue, cooperation, crisis management, conflict management, as well as renewed commitment to collective defense under the changed circumstances. The Alliance's new force posture would place less reliance on nuclear weapons and move away (where appropriate) from the forward presence and pre-positioned equipment previously believed to be necessary for the concept of forward defense.

The Alliance also established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at the 1991 Rome meeting. 38 members subsequently participated in cooperation and consultation on a wide range of political, economic, military and technical/scientific issues.

The military cooperation program of the NACC was then subsumed under the Partnership for Peace program established in January of 1994 to engage non-NATO members in the region constructively in the development of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting, in efforts to ensure democratic control of defense forces, and in more concrete exercises to enable future joint operations. Most of the new republics established from the former Soviet Union and the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization joined the PFP. Some governments joined with a clear view that this is an important step toward eventual full membership in NATO. Russia finally signed the PFP agreement in 1995, but concrete participation remained limited. In part this seemed to be a

protest against the prospect of NATO enlargement to the East. Russian President Boris Yeltsin clearly stated his opposition to any such enlargement, but a NATO study on the subject released in late 1995 suggested the likelihood of eventual membership for some former WTO members. The visit of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Moscow in March of 1996, meant in part to show support for Yeltsin in the Presidential elections scheduled for the following Spring, provoked a response from one member of the Russian cabinet, who stated flatly "Russia will never accept NATO enlargement, because Russia will never accept such a change in its geopolitical situation."⁸ NATO initially found that it had to walk a difficult line between provoking a strong nationalistic response from Russia and giving Russian leaders in effect a veto power over NATO membership and programs. The initial enlargement, with the accession of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, proceeded rather smoothly, and the most recent new members --Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia-- brought the total to 26 meeting for the first time in the NATO-Russia Council on April 2, 2004. Early Russian opposition to enlargement appeared to have faded, at least publicly.

The Alliance also adapted its conception of involvement "Out of Area" and struggled to find a workable formula for participation in peace-keeping operations. These changes reflect a widespread recognition that new thinking and perhaps new structures were required in the new environment.

The NATO experience with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia illustrates the struggles and challenges involved in making these changes work. The Alliance first stated its readiness to support peacekeeping operations in the region under the authority of the UN Security Council in December 1992. Subsequently, it took decisions to enforce, in conjunction with the WEU, the UN embargo in

the Adriatic and to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO officials seem generally to regard these operations as successful and good examples of the "subcontracting" role that NATO forces might be able to perform in other operations authorized by the Security Council.

The Alliance, however, next agreed to provide close air support for UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and air strikes to relieve the siege of Sarajevo and other UN "safe areas." These operations proved not to be satisfactory, from the NATO viewpoint, largely because of the cumbersome dual-key decision system mandated in the agreement with the UN. Tension also developed between the U.S. and the European members that had significant forces on the ground as part of UNPROFOR. The emergence of popular and Congressional sentiment in the U.S. in support of the Moslem Bosnians led to frequent calls by Congressional leaders like Senator (and then Presidential candidate) Bob Dole for an end to the arms embargo, which many charged was only punishing the Moslem side. At the same time, these critics maintained a strong insistence that U.S. ground troops not be used in Bosnia. This tack did not sit well in London and Paris in particular.

The Alliance initiated a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept in January of 1994 in order to adapt NATO more effectively to the peace-keeping role in a range of operations by NATO or the WEU, and perhaps in cooperation with forces from non-member countries. This initiative was also meant, in part, to support the EU/WEU efforts toward establishing the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) emerging out of the Common Foreign and Security Policy provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. These efforts reflected concern about the long term reliability of the U.S. commitment to NATO, but they also focused on the need to develop a system of sharing or perhaps "renting" of military assets that were already operational within the forces of NATO members for use

by the EU/WEU. This of course derived from the clear lack of support for increases in defense expenditures among EU/WEU members.

The Clinton Administration, frustrated by the impotence of NATO to stop the Bosnian Serb assaults on UN (Moslem) safe areas, operating under the dual-key system, developed a plan for large-scale U.S. support of a NATO plan for withdrawal of UNPROFOR. This plan, which called for 70,000 more NATO troops and operations over perhaps 3-4 months to ensure a safe withdrawal, was the subject of acrimonious debate within NATO during the Spring and Summer of 1995. Timely interventions by the newly elected President of France, Jacques Chirac, who called for a stronger NATO role, together with reversals suffered by Bosnian Serb forces at the hands of Croat and Moslem Bosnian forces in the field, turned the tide in favor of a stronger diplomatic initiative from the Clinton Administration. This resulted in an intense Conference of the warring parties at Wright-Patterson Airforce Base in Dayton, Ohio in the Fall of 1995. Strong U.S. pressure was brought to bear on the delegates, and NATO committed to enforce the settlement finally reached (this time without a UN dual-key system). The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) has operated without much difficulty and with limited casualties to date. The prospects for a lasting peace, however, remain uncertain at best. IFOR and SFOR worked well with the OSCE to promote orderly elections in Bosnia, but the continuing threat of U.S. force withdrawal leads one to wonder whether renewed conflict will be snatched from the jaws of the tentative peace.

The operation in Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 was authorized in order to stop a humanitarian catastrophe and restore stability in a strategic region lying between Alliance member states. There remains considerable controversy over the large scale bombing of Belgrade, and

particularly on the question of whether military assets, especially weapons and military vehicles were in fact destroyed effectively from high altitudes. The fact remains, however, that the Milosevic regime was moved to pull out of Kosovo. His subsequent electoral defeat and removal from office in a largely bloodless popular movement must be regarded as a partial result of the NATO pressure.

After the end of military operation, NATO formed the core of the international peacekeeping mission to Kosovo, or Kosovo Force (KFOR), in which some 46,000 military personnel from 39 countries were deployed. The mission sought to build a secure environment within the Serbian province in which all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins, could live in peace and, with international aid, democracy can begin to grow (NATO 2000; see also Indep. Internatl. Com. On Kosovo 2000, pp. 227-298). KFOR worked to help the civilian community and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to overcome the horrors of war, seeking to establish the foundations for a peaceful, tolerant, multi-ethnic society in the future (See Robertson, 2000; and Indep. Internatl. Com. On Kosovo 2000, pp. 259-279).

Curiously, concern about the requirement for unanimity in NATO "intervention" decisions, though always potentially problematic, seemed not to hinder an active role in the former Yugoslavia. This is perhaps not what one would expect, given the differing interests and perspectives held by key members, and the general inaction or at least lack of unity/coherence that might describe the Alliance at other points in its history. One can now speak of a new activist role for NATO, responding concretely to threats on the European periphery, instead of focusing largely on ensuring that its strategy, defensive posture, and forces were credible enough to deter a (Soviet) threat to the core of

Germany, Benelux and perhaps France. But clear disagreement among NATO members over the appropriate posture toward Iraq reaffirms the limits on an activist role on the periphery of Europe.

Engagement through the NACC and especially the PfP might also be seen as important, as incipient state making support efforts. The record since in the early 1990s would include considerable effort to promote civilian control of the military and defense expenditures in line with security needs and important domestic reform priorities.

For its first 35 years of history, the European Community studiously avoided incursions into defense and security policy. Political cooperation and efforts to arrive at common positions in various international fora and negotiations evolved gradually after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, but it was the Maastricht session of the European Council in December of 1991 which established a concrete break with the past policy of avoidance. Heads of State there adopted the Treaty on European Union, commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty which came into force in November of 1993 after it had been ratified by 12 member states. This Treaty established three pillars of Union, the second of which focused on the evolution of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The EU has been most active on the diplomatic side of response to the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. President George Bush (sr.) was eager to leave responsibility for this crisis to Europe – a decision that may seem unfortunate in retrospect, and which points to the other end of the challenge of transatlantic security cooperation. Namely, how do European allies with limited capability engage the U.S. in European operations (especially on the ground) when there is domestic or, more importantly, Presidential reluctance? The challenge of US reluctance seems distant in the post-9/11 environment, but it may well re-emerge broadly and continues to be a factor in proposed

interventions in civil wars and other circumstances less directly connected to the “war on terrorism” (viz. the Congo and Sudan in 2003-4).

The 1992 London Conference on Yugoslavia was chaired by the President of the European Council, British Prime Minister John Major (along with the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali as a joint EU-UN initiative). A range of high level diplomats from the EU sought to bring the combatants together on territorial compromises and cease fires. These include, of course, Sir David Owen who labored for so long with Cyrus Vance of the U.S. to seek agreement on the ill-fated Vance-Owen peace plan, after similar efforts by Lord Carrington, also appointed by the EU had failed.

There does appear to be prospect for more significant development of security policy and cooperation in the EU/WEU, but it seems clear that significant "threat" to the core member states must be more apparent than at present for real force integration and increased military spending. Domestic economic priorities have led the principal political representatives, especially in the Council of Ministers, to focus on programs and policies that address persistent Union-wide economic stagnation and unemployment challenges.

While one may expect little near term formation of a substantial EU military force able to intervene in European conflicts like that seen in the former Yugoslavia, the EU can be seen as a "force" for regional order in other ways. It obviously serves at times as a political counter weight to external influence from great powers. Unity among Europe's "middle powers" may not add up to a second or third superpower, particularly given recent national defense spending trends, but it may help to deter more active meddling from the periphery or from the U.S. The recent efforts toward an

EU initiative for Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management are also interesting. This approach is proactive and aimed at making "more systematic and co-ordinated use of EU instruments to get at the root causes of conflict." (see the Commission's "Communication on Conflict Prevention" of April, 2001). An EU Programme on Conflict Prevention was adopted by the General Affairs Council in June of 2001 and endorsed by the European Council at Goteborg.

Moreover, the European Union has a long record of foreign aid and technical assistance to key areas on the periphery of Europe and in Central Asia proper. Much of this is carried on through national overseas development assistance (ODA) efforts, but the EU committed more than 4 billion Euros in resources through its TACIS Programme to this region between 1991 and 1999. 3.14 billion Euros were then committed for the period 2000-2006; substantial new commitments to the reconstruction of Afghanistan are in the works (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations).

While EU members are still suffering under what has been a lengthy period of stagnation, high unemployment, and seemingly ineffectual economic policies, the core of the region must be regarded as prosperous and stable in large measure. The project of European economic integration must be given due credit for much of this achievement -- an achievement that even the strongest "Euro-pessimists" would hardly expect to crumble in the near to medium term future.

The necessity of a joint European security and defense policy has become even clearer in the context of the NATO military operations in Yugoslavia. On the one hand, the Alliance demonstrated its strength, as the only force capable of fulfilling security functions throughout Europe -- demonstrating a basis for the continental security architecture. Washington assured European allies of US interest in preserving strong transatlantic ties as a precondition for the successful solution of

security problems in Europe. On the other hand, the development of the operations and the process of decision-making within NATO have challenged, to a certain extent, the commitment of European allies to the traditional subordinated role of Europe. In addition, the US demonstrated reluctance on the deployment of its own troops to the Balkans generally and to Kosovo in particular. Approximately two thirds of NATO troops deployed in the Balkans were from EU countries (Patten, 2000).

In November of 1999, EU foreign and defense ministers for the first time proposed the idea of the creation of military Euro-corps of approximately 40,000 troops for conflict management and resolution. The decision was not an easy one because on the one hand, the logic of expanding the EU required the potential rise of commitments in new security spheres. On the other hand, the countries seemed unwilling to abandon the American “umbrella” or to cast serious doubt on transatlantic relations. Some countries (especially the UK) sought to restrain this process, stressing that the corps “would come together only in times of crisis and therefore fall well short of becoming a European army” (Gartner, p. 133).

At the December 1999 Summit in Helsinki, EU leaders decided to create within 3 years, a Rapid Reaction Force of 50-60,000 troops capable of being deployed within 60 days. Taking rotation into account, that means a commitment of some 200,000 troops. As Chris Patten argued, “all this represents the beginning of a genuine European Security and Defense Policy” (Patten, 2000).

Subsequently, EU leaders agreed in June 2000 in Portugal to form concrete targets for civilian police capabilities. The plan was that by 2003 the EU would be able to provide up to 5000 police officers for crisis situations beyond EU borders, with 1000 of these able to be deployed within 30

days. Similar goals are being developed in the areas of civil protection and support for the rule of law.

Efforts to create European military or police forces received an ambivalent response from Washington, which faced a key challenge: how to cut spends for peacekeeping operations overseas without simultaneously weakening the Alliance. The US accepted reassurance from EU members that the new forces will not undermine NATO, but military experts and officials expressed concern. William Cohen, US defense secretary in the Clinton Administration, warned that NATO would become a "relic" unless the plans were closely tied to the Alliance. Under pressure from the US (and the UK), it was decided that the formation of military forces would be tightly connected with NATO policy and resources. At the eve of the EU Summit in Nice, at the beginning of 2001, top European officials worked out proposals for a "mutual access approach". The EU hoped its plans would guarantee for the European force access to NATO assets, such as intelligence. In exchange, the Alliance's planners would have effective control of any large-scale EU military operation.

The EU also proposed "guaranteed permanent access" to NATO's planning capabilities, under precise arrangements involving close co-operation between the future EU military committee, an EU military staff and NATO planners. A procedure of "joint discussions" was spelled out. The EU approved the formal establishment of the military committee, a military staff and a political and security committee (Peel 2000).

It seems clear that the European Union is not ready at this stage to build large military forces with a new complex and expensive infrastructure. The necessity of meeting simultaneously several goals connected with the redefinition of EU structures and programs, particularly with potential

enlargement eastward, will involve too much in the way of political and financial resources. Moreover, there are disagreements within the EU on the issue of the depth in the development of the common foreign and security policy especially regarding its military aspects. Figure 1 provides a modest chronology of major steps in strengthening the EU and NATO as security organizations since the end of the Cold War. The most recent decision by the EU to send a peace keeping force to the Congo is a very interesting development, both as an important new military commitment by the EU itself and as a risk to its credibility as an actor independent of NATO. French enthusiasm for this commitment appeared to be a critical component.

Figure 1

KEY Post-COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN SECURITY

May 1991 – Signs of break-up of Yugoslavia and onset of civil war; Croatia and Slovenia declare independence and receive (premature?) recognition from Germany (and at Germany's urging the EU)

1991-93 – U.S. President bush, fresh off the Persian Gulf War victory, declines an active US response. Europeans seem "eager" to accept European responsibility; it is seen by many as an opportunity for mediation role in the run-up to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the EU with a Common Foreign and Security Policy (1993)

July 1992 – NATO ships begin monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of UN SC Res. 713 and 757 imposing an arms embargo and sanctions in the former Yugoslavia

Nov. 1992 – NATO and the WEU begin enforcement operations of the sanctions and embargo imposed under UNSCR 787

Feb. 1994 – In response to request from UN SG, NATO Council authorizes air strikes to end the strangulation of Sarajevo

Aug. 1995 – Following continued attacks by Bosnian Serb forces on Sarajevo, NATO commences air strikes against Serb military targets, supported by the UN Rapid Reaction Force

Dec. 14, 1995 – General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Accords) signed in Paris

Dec. 16, 1995 – Beginning of the deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in accordance with UNSCR 1031, transferring authority for military operations in Bosnia from UNPROFOR to NATO

Dec. 20, 1996 -- IFOR replaced by SFOR (Stabilization Force)

May 28, 1998 -- NATO foreign ministers agree that the Alliance should seek to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo crisis

Oct. 13, 1998 -- NATO Council authorizes activation orders for air strikes in support of diplomatic efforts to get Milosevic regime to withdraw forces from Kosovo; The OSCE establishes a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and NATO begins aerial surveillance mission in support of UNSCR 1199 imposing conditions for a cease-fire

March 23 -June, 10, 1999 -- 78-day NATO air campaign against Serb forces

June 12, 1999 -- First Elements of KFOR enter Kosovo in accordance with UNSCR 1244

April 23, 1999 -- Antonio Guterres, Prime Minister of Portugal:

"We are an Alliance. Have we got an enemy? I think yes.... Our enemy is extreme nationalism, religious fundamentalism, racism, xenophobia, ethnic cleansing. That is why we must succeed in Kosovo, fully guaranteeing the rights of the Kosovar people."

May 29, 2001 -- Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary:

"Democratization in the Balkans could not have started without NATO."

Aug. 22, 2001 -- NATO launches Operation Essential Harvest in response to request from President of Macedonia to collect and destroy all weapons voluntarily from National Liberation Army (NLA)

September 12, 2001 -- the 19 members of the NATO alliance took the extraordinary (first time ever) step to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Article 5 provides that "an armed attack against one or more of them [the Parties] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." This article (and its invocation) does not dictate what type of action must be taken, but it does seem to require some action or at least the offer of concrete support.

May 24, 2002 -- Rome Summit finalizes NATO-Russia Council (NRC) providing full decision making power for Russia

Nov 22, 2002 -- Prague Transformation Summit; NATO votes to enlarge to the East (adding Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria); Also votes to establish 20,000 person Rapid Reaction Force; Verbal support for disarming Iraq

June 5, 2003 - 15 Governments of European Union agree to send a joint peacekeeping force to the Congo in an effort to control ethnic violence. (First such military operation by the EU)

April 2, 2004 - Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia admitted formally into NATO-- brought the total to 27 meeting for the first time in the NATO-Russia Council

May 1, 2004 -- Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta admitted formally into European Union

June, 2004 -- Istanbul Cooperation Initiative begun to elevate NATO's Mediterranean dialogue to strengthened ties with the broader Middle East. Initial partners: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE

Feb. 1-3, 2005 -- NATO conducts operation Allied Reach in Norway as rehearsal for NATO response force deployment

Feb. 19, 2005 -- Project for destruction of excess weapons and ammunition in Ukraine initiated.

March 31, 2005 -- NATO and Australia sign agreement on exchange of classified information as step to closer cooperation.

April 21, 2005 -- Russia signs Partnership status of forces agreement with NATO to facilitate movement of allied troops in Russia and movement of Russian troops in allied territory.

Jan. 31, 2006 -- Secretary General Japp de Hopp Scheffer affirms NATO's long term commitment to Afghanistan.

Feb. 15, 2006 -- NATO opens Resettlement and Retraining Center in Ukraine to deal with consequences of defense reform.

March 21, 2006 -- NATO Secretary General condemns conduct of Belarus elections.

March 23 2006 -- NATO ships discover illegal transfer of immigrants in the Mediterranean Sea

April 27, 2006 -- NATO Foreign Ministers explore expansion of cooperation with non-member countries at Sofia, Bulgaria meeting.

May 10, 2006 -- NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps takes command of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan.

May 10, 2006 – NATO Missile Defense Feasibility Study is delivered to North Atlantic Council

May 12, 2006 – Discussions on NATO=Russia scientific cooperation in Novosibirsk as part of NATO-Russia Rally

July 31, 2006 – NATO-led International Security Assistance Force takes over command of the Southern region of Afghanistan from US-led Coalition forces.

Oct. 23-26, 2006 – NATO Lazio 2006 anti-terrorist response exercise is conducted in Italy with teams from Italy, the Russian Federation, Austria, Croatia, Hungary and Romania; dirty bomb attack is simulated.

Nov. 28, 2006 – NATO heads of State and Government at meeting in Riga, Latvia decide on strengthened commitment to NATO's Afghanistan mission. They also endorsed a document on Comprehensive Political Guidance, and discussed measures for enhanced strategic airlift and theater and broader missile defense. The NATO Response Force was declared fully operational.

Dec. 12, 2006 – Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia join Partnership for Peace.

Dec. 12, 2006 – NATO-Kuwait conference on cooperation with Gulf countries.

Jan. 2007 – Destruction of 400,000 small arms and light weapons in Ukraine; milestone in World's largest demilitarization project.

March 2, 2007 – African Union officials visit NATO HQ for discussions on long-term cooperation.

May 17-18, 2007 – NATO-Russia Council convenes conference on terrorism in Ankara, Turkey.

Sept. 26, 2007 – French Expeditionary Air Group begins support mission for ISAF in Afghanistan.

Oct. 7, 2007 – NATO and several cooperating countries including Japan, UAE, and Israel commence exercise in Albania.

Oct. 9, 2007 – NATO concludes International Cooperation Program with Egypt as step in Mediterranean dialogue.

Oct.15, 2007 – NATO-Russia Council meets with EU-US-Russia Troika to discuss settlement between Kosovo Albanian leadership and Serbia

The post-cold war European institutionalism has been somewhat successful because it has been based on long-lasting and well-structured organizations (NATO and the EU) with limited membership, well-designed procedures and (most importantly) mechanisms for implementing their decisions. The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) because of its large membership and complicated process of decision-making, must be considered as "primarily a tension-reducing mechanism". The OSCE is a collective forum for the discussion of urgent problems (a sort of European General Assembly), but not a mechanism for true conflict resolution or security response. Moreover, an attempt to expand institutional functions endlessly, and to make more complex its structure with the aim to achieve a truly universal institution, will be doomed to defeat.

It does seem clear that the combined impact of institutions gives dramatically more effect than each state acting alone. There is real value in the coordination of efforts of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union with respect to the post-communist transformation in Central European countries and in the response to 9-11. A joint strategy is needed in the most sensitive aspects of their activity with the aim of achieving coincidence of economic and political resources, and one might argue that the tasks of the post-communist transformations accelerated the functional and structural rapprochement between NATO and the European Union. A key element of this, of course, is the posture of Russia. Since 2000, Russia has both sought to improve defense cooperation with many of the other successor states of the former Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), establishing a Collective Rapid Reaction Force in May 2001, and to move closer to NATO. NATO enlargement remains a tough issue for many Russians, but some anxiety may have been relieved with the establishment of a NATO-Russia Council as a result of the Rome Summit in May of 2002. Some have suggested that this increase in the Russian role in NATO decision-making was a reward for substantial assistance in the post-9-11 war against terrorism, but it also seemed to pave the way for little critical Russian response to the Prague "Transformation" Summit in November 2002 which sanctioned the process of accession for 7 new NATO members.

The "Institutional" Response to 9-11, Iraq and North Korea

On September 12, 2001, the 19 members of the NATO alliance took the extraordinary (first time ever) step to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Article 5 provides that "an armed

attack against one or more of them [the Parties] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." This article (and its invocation) does not dictate what type of action must be taken, but it does seem to require some action or at least the offer of concrete support. In the days and weeks that followed, individual NATO allies, members of the European Union and a range of other states agreed to join in a coalition against international terrorism with commitments of various kinds and levels. Much of this involved ratcheting up local police work to uncover "cells" of the Al Qaeda network and other potential terrorist suspects. But there were also specific undertakings to commit military, logistics, and intelligence assets through NATO and its Partnership for Peace network, as well as commitments of cooperation through U.S. and foreign financial institutions to try to unravel the complex financial network and transactions involved in support of Al Qaeda and to freeze accounts and holdings. The European Union has taken a wide variety of actions on several fronts, in line with UN Security Council resolutions, to freeze assets, investigate money laundering, stabilize financial markets, provide humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees, tighten air safety and security and upgrade its system for civil protection and surveillance and control of communicable diseases.

The military operations in Afghanistan, in cooperation with the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban Afghans, were remarkably efficient and decisive. The combination of vastly superior U.S. military technology with motivated local ground troops, supported by U.S. special forces and intelligence personnel was very impressive. NATO and EU members have been involved in the subsequent operations to stabilize and support the new Afghan Government in its massive task of national reconstruction, but the military operations were largely a U.S. show. Some NATO member

politicians, most notably the French, complained about a lack of consultation and an unwillingness by U.S. military planners to take advantage of forces offered by European governments. This is probably inevitable in this kind of operation, given the apparent disparity between the U.S. and other NATO members in much of the most appropriate weapon technology, but it reflects a common challenge in coalition building and maintenance. One should note that members of Prime Minister Blair's own Labor Party criticized the UK decision in mid-March, 2002 to send 1,700 troops trained in arctic and mountain warfare to Afghanistan. This was in response to a request from the U.S. for help in "flushing out" the remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. Fissures in the initial wall of support are not surprising, and they will grow if the coalition management efforts are careless or unduly expansionist.

Beyond the relationships with and support from core NATO members like the British, French and Germans, the Turks and PfP members like the Uzbeks provided crucial support and landing rights. Among the non-NATO members of the anti-terrorism coalition, Pakistan obviously was the most valuable participant. Since the fall of the Taliban regime, several NATO member states provided police and peace-keeping personnel to help stabilize the situation and permit the beginning of reconstruction efforts. The German government was among the most active in this respect and suffered the loss of a significant number of personnel in bombings and other attacks. The Germans also provided the venue for the key meetings of Afghan leaders that led to the formation of the current government led by Hamid Karzai.

How did this clear example of allied cooperation degenerate so completely by the end of 2003? Was it mostly the product of an emerging divergence of interests between the U.S. and

Europe that Kupchan and others describe? Or was it more the product of arrogance, undue haste, and mismanagement within the US defense and foreign policy establishment and in its diplomacy? Allied unity was lost in part due to serious differences between the U.S. and Europe in perceived interests and worldviews, but maybe more dramatically and quickly than need be because there was a failure to consult appropriately, particularly with proud and previously supportive allies like France and Germany. This was complicated by an unnecessary urgency to press ahead partly stemming from supreme over-confidence perhaps partly due to timing considerations (erroneous as they now appear) relevant to the Presidential elections. This in turn limited the prospect for effective multilateral diplomacy in an environment where the U.S. Administration already had a poor reputation, somewhat needlessly in some key cases (Kyoto, NPT, etc.) when serious U.S. interests were not really at stake. It also exacerbated the now apparent unreadiness of the Administration for the massive tasks of stabilization and reconstruction, especially without the kind of partnerships that had worked so well in Bosnia, Kosovo and perhaps even Afghanistan. I worry about the long term effects of this calamity on future allied cooperation in the face of an extremely complex and serious set of threats to Atlantic and Eurasian security may be serious.

One can argue also that the attack on 9-11 and the anti-terrorist operations since demonstrate some key elements of the realist argument, namely that the international system is anarchic and threatening to even the most powerful and geographically separated, and that raw military power is indispensable. Does this mean that the march toward order through liberal institutionalism was misguided or ephemeral? Perhaps, but the years since 9-11 also suggest the indispensability of international cooperation in the face of an extremely complex threat to security. Moreover, I think

there is clear evidence that the period since 9-11 also suggests the importance of stabilizing Central and Southwest Asia, something that cannot be done through the independent actions of one state, almost no matter how powerful.

Tom Friedman spoke of Russia gradually replacing France in a new NATO that seeks to struggle against the “World of Disorder” (The New York Times, March 30, 2003) . He did not simply dream up this notion that may seem fanciful at first glance. NATO and U.S. defense planners are giving serious consideration to new international security structures that may not be at all in line with traditional Gaullist preferences. Chirac indeed may have over-played his hand on Iraq, but the Sarkozy government so far seems to have a strong transatlantic orientation.

The bombing of trains in Madrid and the subsequent change in the Spanish government provided a reminder of the transatlantic tensions and disagreement over Iraq, but they also may presented an interesting opportunity for statesmanship and increased cooperation in Europe and between Europe and the US. This severe attack on continental Europe stimulated new thinking and consultations in the capitals of Europe, not to mention an emergency meeting of EU interior ministers and a new declaration from the European Council on the “Fight Against Terrorism” (15 March 2004), at the same time that it generates renewed criticism of the Bush Administration’s push for early military intervention. If one observes the 2004 communiqués on European defense and security strategy, it is clear that the views of European government decision-makers or their designees (as opposed to their publics) are not dissimilar from the position on threats and strategies offered by the U.S., including the focus on non-proliferation and WMDs. What remains to be seen is what concrete steps and expenditures will be taken to implement this strategy. It may well be that the U.S. and

Europe will yet find each other's roles indispensable again to global security. The days of Europeans trying to tie the U.S. down to a clear commitment to European defense with trip-wires and forward basing strategies may be gone, but Madrid may demonstrate that European, transatlantic and Eurasian security may require concrete collaboration and diminished rhetoric. Will this be increased and concrete European collaboration, involving real expenditures and hard choices, perhaps even independent of the U.S., or will it be more of the same story of half measures and subservience, albeit quarrelsome subservience, to the U.S.? What role can Russia play in Eurasian security enhancement?

Has the NATO-Russia Council Made a Difference?

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established with the Rome Declaration, "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality," at a meeting of Heads of State and Government, May 28, 2002. It has been a useful forum for improving NATO-Russian relations, conducting meetings and joint training exercises ever since. Topics of mutual interest include: interoperability of fuels and equipment; counter-terrorism; metro security; countering the "dirty bomb;" counter narcotics training; transport security; CBW protection; defense budgeting, accounting, auditing and cost control; and defense reform more generally. A NATO-Resettlement Center was established in Moscow in March of 2002, with the aim of retraining and reintegrating discharged Russian military personnel throughout Russia. 210 trainers conduct courses in computer skills, management and accounting, and a network of regional websites facilitates information transfer, job counseling and placement.

The NRC promotes operational cooperation, particularly by including Russian ships in NATO naval exercises. For example, in September 2007, Russian Black Sea Fleet patrol ship "Ladny"

participated in NATO's Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, and the Russian Frigate "Pytliviy" participated in a similar operation in September 2006, focused on the common threat of maritime terrorism.

Nonetheless, it is hard to argue that the NATO-Russia Council has performed to the expectations that some had for it. Russia was included in NATO affairs and operations to an unprecedented degree, but it was still kept from a prominent decision-making role, largely for fear of providing it a veto over proposed operations and institutional development. Parallel efforts to bring Russia into other key Eurasian institutions (the EU-Russia "common spaces" designed to Europeanize Russia economically and socially and build trust politically; adding Russia to the G-7 to form a G-8; and Russian admission to the Council of Europe) may be described similarly – useful, but not a major new Eurasian partnership. In the words of Dmitri Trenin,

These arrangements did not so much fail as grossly underperform. The G-8 is still the old G-7 plus Russia, even though Russia technically has equal status with the other countries (except when the finance ministers meet). The NATO-Russia Council is merely a low-key technical-cooperation workshop operating at NATO's side. The EU-Russia road maps for the creation of the "common spaces," meant to enhance cooperation on the basis of greater mutual compatibility, offer only a set of very general objectives with no hard commitments that just paper over a growing gap. The Council of Europe, especially its Parliamentary Assembly, has turned into an oratorical battle-ground between Russian lawmakers and their European counterparts on Chechnya and other human rights issues. (Trenin, 2006, pp.14-15).

U.S. –Russian Collaboration on Arms Control

A brief look at issues of arms control and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction illustrates the ups and downs, as well as the continued importance, of US-Russian cooperation. Arms

control, especially bilateral strategic arms control and European regional confidence-building and conventional force reduction agreements were the leading edge of détente in the 1970s, matters of grave concern in the early 1980s, and, finally, the hallmark of Gorbachev's "new thinking" and breakthroughs with Presidents Reagan and Bush [START I, START II, IMF, CFE]. These breakthroughs, as well as multilateral deals on chemical weapons [1993] and nuclear testing [1996] in the early 1990s would seem to have cemented an era of unprecedented cooperation in the reduction, dismantling, monitoring, and cooperative management of WMD stockpiles on both sides. Yet these genuine accomplishments—accompanied by unprecedented confidence building measures, data exchange, and inspections—stand alongside a US refusal to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty and a formal withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002. These US steps reflect a change of focus to the post-Cold War threat environment, one with deep roots in a late Cold War insistence on finding an alternative to mutual assured destruction in strategic defenses. September 11th accelerated this trend. Russia, in turn, has opposed these moves, wondered about US motives, and by and large responded with frustration and restraint until President Putin's suspension of the CFE Treaty this year.

In a sense, neither side has adequately taken account of the impact of the fall of the Soviet Union on the strategic environment. What were once the central questions facing Moscow and Washington (and watched closely by the whole world) almost overnight seemed to disappear or be transformed into new concerns over "loose" nuclear weapons and other WMD spreading from a chaotic post-Soviet space to countries like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea or terrorist organizations. The economic setbacks of Russia and other new states of the former USSR seemed for Washington

to transform the strategic question from one of organized rivalry to a need for a new kind of cooperation to address the danger of disorganized leakage. This new cooperation inevitably had to be formed in a time of radical inequality between the two partners, with Russia suffering economic decline and military retrenchment. As a participant in US-Russian defense and strategic dialogue from the late 1980s until 1994, I saw firsthand the difficulties of facing new issues in new conditions with many of the old issues and old suspicions unresolved.

In retrospect, a genuine strategic transition to lower offensive systems and new defensive technologies would have been easier if Russia had been a more equal partner and key questions like the ABM Treaty and small-scale missile defense deployments could have been agreed upon and implemented together. No serious Russian analyst sees the proposed deployment of ten interceptors in Poland as a threat to Russia's first-strike capacity, yet the steps that have led to Russia being on the outside looking in, the potential for future deployments down the road, and the reluctance of Washington to look seriously at expanding the system to include Soviet (now Russian) ABM radar sites in Azerbaijan must legitimately make these analysts wonder. Both sides underestimated the need to hold the old process of negotiation and cooperation together as real changes in the strategic environment were addressed. Washington, for its part, underestimated the staying power of cooperation based largely on new issues, such as loose nukes, and unilateral moves on the old strategic issues that once define US-Soviet relations. Though Moscow thus far seems not to have overreacted to this US unilateralism, it did not understand that fundamental changes were needed to the bilateral strategic system when the main threats come from outside of the bilateral rivalry. In retrospect, the period of advanced Russian defense collapse—at one point its ten-year arms control

obligations under the CWC exceeded its entire annual defense budget—also played a crucial role.

Neither side moved swiftly enough to institutionalize new issues on an equal footing. Ethnic conflict, terrorism, the rise of new- and medium-powers along the Eurasian rim are issues on which the two sides share common concerns, but these have often been overshadowed by particular differences over one or another's policies (Russia's intentions in the former USSR and the US invasion of Iraq are prime examples). Military and commercial issues have made Moscow a more sensitive listener to Tehran's side of the story. Many Russian analysts during the 1990s stated that the common bilateral interest in controlling the spread of WMD was weaker than the particular interests in keeping MINATOM afloat or sustaining needed defense industries through arms sales during the times when the Russian military could not buy needed equipment.

Figure 2

KEY Post-COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMS CONTROL

1968 – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is signed. It was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology to those beyond the original countries that already possessed them: the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, France and China.

1972 – Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is signed.

1972 – Interim Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT I) is signed between the US and U.S.S.R. SALT II negotiations then commence, leading to signature in 1979, but it is never ratified by the U.S. Senate. The terms are honored by both sides, however, until 1986 when President Reagan announces withdrawal from the SALT II process.

1987 – The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is signed between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (It is ratified in 1988.) It sought to destroy all missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers.

1992 – Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is signed.

1993 – Chemical Weapons Convention is signed. It banned the manufacture and use of chemical weapons.

1994 – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) is signed.

1996 – Wassenarr Arrangement is established between the U.S. and the Russian Federation and many other weapons producers (but not China or North Korea). It was designed to promote transparency and responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies to promote regional stability.

1996 – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is signed. It banned all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes.

Dec. 2001 – U.S. President George W. Bush announces U.S. will withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

2002 – Treaty on Open Skies. Signed and ratified by 34 states including the U.S. and the Russian Federation, this treaty established permission for unarmed aerial surveillance flights to enhance confidence and understanding on military forces and activities.

2003 – Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) is signed in Moscow.

Jan. 2007 – Destruction of 400,000 small arms and light weapons in Ukraine; milestone in World's largest demilitarization project.

Nov. 2007 – President Putin announces suspension of Russian participation in CFE

The successes in arms control collaboration have become overshadowed by a recent chill in U.S.-Russian relations that leads some analysts to fear renewed confrontation. Dimitri Simes, for example, speaks of “Losing Russia” in a recent article that points to “Russia’s newfound assertiveness” and lays substantial responsibility for it at the door of U.S. policy makers in their arrogance and inattention. He stresses that

...numerous disagreements do not mean that Russia is an enemy. After all, Russia has not supported al Qaeda or any other terrorist group at war with the United States and no longer promotes a rival ideology with the goal of world domination. Nor has it invaded or threatened to invade its neighbors. Finally, Russia has opted not to foment separatism in Ukraine, despite the existence there of a large and vocal Russian minority population. (Simes, 2007, p. 48)

But Russia has interests that cannot be ignored or softpeddled, and its growing financial independence reduces any Western leverage that might have been prevalent in the Yeltsin years. Simes does suggest that the U.S. must be firm in stressing that Iran, nonproliferation and terrorism are crucial to a positive bilateral relationship, and that there are other lines in the sand that must be defended. But clarity and confidence building on key security issues is essential. For example,

Russian concern over the proposed missile defense system to be installed in Poland and the Czech Republic is not surprising and should be managed with clarity and sensitivity. Defense Secretary Gates' recent statements on the timing of "turning on" such a system, only after evidence of near term long range Iranian missile capability is indisputable may be a useful step, particularly if the system design and implementation can be demonstrated/verified to be too limited in scope to be useful for anything but a threatening rogue state with modest capability.

When one steps back from the particulars of the current disagreements over a wide range of issues, the need to limit the damage from such disagreements and for renewed US-Russian cooperation on strategic issues is clear:

--The new Eurasia will feature many more powers with nuclear, CBW, and advanced missile capabilities. These regions are also home to weak states in danger of internal conflict or collapse, terrorist organizations, and medium- and potentially major-powers, the emergence of which will have a profound impact on both Moscow and Washington. These threats cast shadows well beyond near-term self-assurance on one side or the other that this particular proliferators or ambitious power does not pose a current threat.

--The old strategic agenda is unfinished, especially in terms of dismantling, destroying or storing and protecting WMD-relevant materials and technologies.

--Accidental use is still a danger, and one that is likely in an environment where new WMD powers emerge. Both Russia and the US have extensive experience in confidence-building, data exchanges, hotlines, and cooperative measures that facilitate the intelligence and monitoring systems

and analysts on the other side to judge accurately both forces and intentions.

--The fears of both Moscow and Washington have been exaggerated with regard to the fate of Russia's neighbors. The CIS did not create a new Moscow-centered super state. The long-term strategic landscape in Eurasia must accommodate Russian power and interests, as well as the success of Moscow's neighbors. The US is involved in the politics, economics, and security concerns of these neighbors, but it is difficult to call the pattern that has emerged an attempt of Washington to replace Moscow, let alone a build-up. Souring of relations with Uzbekistan show how difficult Washington's position is and how limited its reach. Only with Russia's recovery will the real issues here emerge, issues more likely to be addressed by bilateral cooperation and integration of the region into multilateral cooperative arrangements. Both countries would prosper from stability in the neighborhood, an avoidance of ethnic violence and extremism, and stable economic progress and political reform.

--There are more ticklish issues to come. Missile defense systems that could respond to accidental, small state, or terrorist launches are needed, but they need to be integrated into a full-scale effort to deal with the range of challenges to prevent the leakage of technology and know-how, secure borders, share intelligence, and develop a genuine capacity for multilateral anti-terrorist operations. Aging C4I assets have to be upgraded and rationalized. The safety and security of existing stockpiles remains a long-term concern, as does the development of safer, cheaper, and more reliable methods of dismantling, storing, and securing WMD. Experts on both sides have talked of new warheads, though the need for them is not clear for either power. Both sides will face these

issues more securely through an existing framework of negotiation and cooperation.

--On both sides, there are many who show no concern about the collapse of the old system of arms control cooperation and, especially in Moscow, a newfound eagerness to act on behalf of its interests. However, in a world of new threats—and especially in a neighborhood where rules and institutions are absent or poorly developed—do we really want to forego the legacy of negotiated and cooperative arrangements, let alone the rules themselves that place important ceilings on force deployments, testing, and other aspects of military action?

Conclusions

Despite numerous predictions and prescriptions, NATO has not been disbanded. Indeed, it can be argued that in some ways it is stronger now than during the Cold War. The Alliance's decision June 12, 2003 to support U.S. proposals to reorganize NATO commands and bases and to create a NATO special operations Response Force may be evidence of its vitality and healing. The real question is whether European members of NATO will appropriate additional defense funds for force expansion and technology upgrades. The EU also has some distance to go to reach military or even political maturity.

International institutions have helped to transform Europe. One can certainly find evidence that they are rather more effective and intrusive than in the past. As Western Europe has moved from EFTA and a customs union to the European Union, sovereignty has been transformed, and the quality of democracy has been affected. The initiatives to include the "East" in this Union increasingly must

be regarded as promising steps toward stability in the region. At the same time, the progress toward a new security architecture in Europe is also impressive, though a work in progress. One can certainly quarrel with John Mearsheimer's view that nothing important has been accomplished by European international institutions that wouldn't have happened anyway by independent state action.

If political change in Russia does not result in revanchist nationalism or indeed a campaign to reconstruct the Soviet Union, more universal alternatives to or adaptations of NATO may be worth pursuing. NATO's Partnership for Peace program fits within this rubric, as does the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe. One can contemplate some profitable extension of these models throughout Eurasia. The constraints and challenges are numerous, but the potential benefits to stability in this crucial part of the globe make it worth serious thought and effort. Moreover, the potential alternative of a world divided by heightened great power competition and conflict, perhaps even directly between the U.S. and Russia and/or China (or even a militarily united Europe), would seem to be worth avoiding even if the costs and constraints are substantial. The selective engagement strategy that Kupchan and Trubowitz recommend may be the most feasible option for U.S. foreign policy; it also may lead to a more stable system than the one to which we seem to be stumbling.

Alternatively, if one is inclined toward the traditional French (and now Russian?) view that the U.S. is a "hyper-power" that must be countered/restrained, it should be recalled that the potential for isolationist retreat is real. The reluctance to intervene in the former Yugoslavia was not an historical aberration. President Clinton seemed only willing to consider the use of airpower, and even then was persuaded to do that only at the strenuous behest of Prime Minister Blair. The American public (at least a majority of it) was largely in support of President George W. Bush and his decision to conduct

war in Afghanistan after 9/11 (and indeed later in Iraq), but recent public opinion data suggest clear growth in antipathy about whether either military campaign (especially Iraq) is in the end likely to be worthwhile. This may well be a limited episode of superpower interventionism for security enhancement and humanitarian purposes. A retreat to American isolationism is not at all out of the question, particularly if the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan prove clearly unrewarding ultimately. This may be just what the doctor ordered for some, but if there are common threats to be addressed, a reluctant U.S. partnership may not be any more desirable than an overly eager one. Most of all, the U.S. should not create an enemy where one does not now or need not exist. Wendt's notions of constructivism in international relations may be worth serious reflection in this connection, and there are lessons to be remembered from the picture of the early Cold War years that Marshall Shulman constructed for us so persuasively.

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 - ⁵ See: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, June 1992), and An Agenda for Peace, 2nd edition, (New York: United Nations, 1995).
 - ⁶ See, for example, the expansive writings of Brian Urquart and former Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. A broad range of additional suggestions from UN officials and national delegates in a collection published by The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume III, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 1996), under the section title: "UN Peacekeeping: Challenging a New Era."
 - ⁷ NATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991. p. 1.
 - ⁸ As reported on National Public Radio broadcast, "All Things Considered," March 22, 1996.